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ANASTASIYA TUMANOVA
THE LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA
A history of the struggle for the rule of law1
The issue and how it was approached
Individual liberty is the fundamental principle of liberalism, with inalienable rights 
of society members being the building blocks of the legal theory of liberalism. 
The establishment of civil rights as a foundation for the political‑legal doctrine 
of Russian liberalism is based on a strong historical tradition. My intention is to 
discuss late imperial Russia’s experience in designing a logical, unified construc‑
tion of inviolable individual rights, which was a theoretical justification for the 
constitutionalism of the early twentieth century. This construction was due to the 
school of “revived” (vozrozhdennyi) natural law, which was the most authoritative 
1. This article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research 
Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE). Some 
aspects of this paper were reflected in the preprint of the Higher School of Economics (Anasta‑
siya S. Tumanova, “Subjective Public Rights in the Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism 
in the Early 20th Century,” Series: Law, WP BRP 25/LAW/2013). The paper was translated 
into English by Associate Professor Juri  Zusman (Tambov State University named after 
G.R. Derzhavin) and Professor Alexandra Nagornaya (Moscow City University). The author 
greatly appreciates their help. The author wishes to express gratitude to the first reader of this 
manuscript, Professor Adele Lindenmeyr, who made an invaluable contribution to its revi‑
sion. The main ideas of this paper were presented by the author at the “Trajectories of Law 
and Sovereignty” workshop (7‑8 April 2016) at Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. The author 
would like to thank Jane Burbank, Peter Holquist and Kathryn Hendley for their opinions and 
proposals. Finally, she is especially grateful to the anonymous referees of Cahiers du Monde 
russe for their helpful advice and suggestions.
Cahiers du Monde russe, 57/4, Octobre‑décembre 2016, p. 791‑818.
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in Russian legal philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century.2 Prerevolu‑
tionary Russia’s wealth of legal philosophy, the search for the ideal meaning of 
law, and the prominence of its leading representatives, enable me to claim that the 
turn of the twentieth century was the “golden age” of Russian legal thought. 
Prominent Russian liberally oriented legal scholars such as Pavel  Novgo‑
rodtsev, Vladimir Solov´ev, Bogdan Kistiakovskii, Evgenii Trubetskoi, Vladimir 
Gessen, and others were engaged in the development of the concepts of “revived” 
natural law and the rule‑of‑law state (pravovoe gosudarstvo). Within the frame‑
work of these concepts, they formulated a detailed theory of civil rights and liber‑
ties. Prerevolutionary Russian legal philosophies substantiated the idea that civil 
rights and liberties were natural, inalienable for citizens and inviolable by public 
authority; their recognition, observance, and protection were considered an integral 
duty of the state. They suggested that rights form the basis for the legal doctrine 
that recognizes their natural character as the most essential factor in the formation 
of laws. Legal philosophers believed that the necessary condition for the success 
of reforms was their correspondence to the type of legal consciousness3 that could 
be found in educated society. According to Michel  Tissier, the priority of civil 
rights was the fundamental characteristic of the legal consciousness of the Russian 
educated public, especially liberal lawyers, in 1905 and 1906.4 These ideas were in 
great demand in the twentieth century. 
The study of the doctrine of the “revived natural law” school is instructive for 
modern Russian jurisprudence, which has freed itself from the chains of the Marxist 
dogma and been seeking alternative legal concepts over the last two decades.5 
The results obtained by the representatives of this school, such as the priority of 
the rule‑of‑law state and individual rights, have a heuristic potential for modern 
lawmaking in Russia, which is attempting to work out conceptions of legal policy 
and reform the Russian legal system as a whole. Since these ideas are deeply rooted 
2. Alongside this theory, Russia saw the development of sociological jurisprudence and jurid‑
ical positivism, which also had highly influential representatives. The views of the most prom‑
inent representatives of these schools on civil rights and rule‑of‑law state will also be briefly 
considered in this paper.
3. Legal consciousness is understood as a system of legal views, ideas, notions, beliefs and 
assessments that reflect the attitude of individuals, social groups and the society as a whole 
towards existing or desirable law and towards legal phenomena, as well as various types of 
legal behavior. The paper focuses on the legal consciousness of representatives of Russian 
educated society, primarily the juridical elite. 
4. Michel Tissier, “Kakoe iuridicheskoe prosveshchenie nuzhno v Rossii? Perekhod ot 
populiarizatsii prava k populiarizatsii grazhdanskikh prav [What kind of legal education do 
Russians need? From popularizing the law to popularizing civil rights],” Neprikosnovennyi 
zapas, no. 6 (2005): 58‑62.
5. A more detailed analysis of contemporary Russian legal theories, such as the commu‑
nicative and anthropological theories, can be found in Teoriia pravovoi kommunikatsii i 
problemy sovremennoi iurisprudentsii: Esse v chest´ shestidesiatiletiia professora Andreiia 
V. Poliakova [Theory of legal communication and issues in contemporary jurisprudence: An 
essay in honor of the sixtieth anniversary of Professor Andrei V. Poliakov] (SPb.: Alef‑press, 
2014); Il.L.  Chestnov, Postklassicheskaia teoriia prava [Postclassical theory of law] (SPb.: 
Alef‑press, 2012).
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in the European philosophical and legal tradition of the Modern Period and yet 
reflect specific features of the Russian legal culture, they make it possible to give 
answers to the basic questions of political and legal life (regarding the correlation of 
rights and law, rights and morality, state and person, etc.). 
Certain aspects of the institutionalization of civil rights in liberal juridical theory 
and political philosophy of late imperial Russia have already been discussed in 
academic literature. Andrzej Walicki’s monograph on the philosophical and legal 
heritage of Russian liberalism provides an analysis of the philosophical legal theo‑
ries that were fundamental for the Russian intellectual liberal tradition between the 
second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Along‑
side the “old liberal” legal philosophy represented by Boris Chicherin’s legacy, 
Walicki examines the origins of legal philosophy in the works of Vladimir Solov´ev, 
Pavel Novgorodtsev, and Bogdan Kistiakovskii, searching for their basic ideas on 
“new liberalism.”6 
The foundational monograph by the Russian philosopher Andrei Medushevskii 
describes the influence of the ideas of Pavel  Novgorodtsev, Vladimir  Gessen, 
Bogdan Kistiakovskii, Sergei Kotliarevskii, and other jurists on the jurisprudence 
of the early twentieth century. He points out their adherence to the liberal paradigm 
of social restructuring, the idea of the rule of law and the strategy of modernization 
without revolution.7
Philosopher Viacheslav Zhukov values the “revived natural law” school for 
uniting a wide range of liberal thinkers of different methodological backgrounds 
(Neo‑Kantianism, Neo‑Hegelianism, personalism), for imbibing national peculi‑
arities of Russian philosophy and legal culture, and for combining the principle of 
individualism with social and state interests.8 Lawyer Andrei Poliakov points out 
that the representatives of this school resolved the basic issue of legal theory about 
the notion of law and its essential features, in particular the crucial importance of 
moral principles, which constitute the criterion that the law must meet.9 
Apart from the listed works dealing with the rights of Russian citizens at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, thus far there has been no generalizing research 
enabling us to assess the status and extent of the theoretical elaboration of the topic. 
6. Andrzej Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1987). 
7. A.N.  Medushevskii, Dialog so vremenem: Rossiiskie konstitutsionalisty kontsa XIX – 
nachala XX veka [A dialogue with time: Russian constitutionalists in the late nineteenth – early 
twentieth centuries] (M.: Novyi khronograf, 2010).
8. V.N.  Zhukov, Russkaia filosofiia prava: Estestvenno‑pravovaia shkola pervoi poloviny 
XX veka [Russian philosophy of law: The natural law school of the first half of the twen‑
tieth century] (M.: Rossiiskoe gumanisticheskoe obshchestvo, 2001), 125, 214.
9. A.V.  Poliakov, “Mozhet li pravo byt´ nepravym? Nekotorye aspekty dorevoliutsionnogo 
rossiiskogo pravoponimaniia [Can the law be wrong? Some aspects of prerevolutionary Russian 
understanding of law],” Izvestiia vysshikh uchebnykh zavedenii. Pravovedenie, no. 4 (1997): 
95‑104. See also: Poliakov, “Proshchanie s klassikoi ili kak vozmozhna kommunikativnaia 
teoriia prava [Farewell to classics, or What makes a communicative law theory possible],” 
Rossiiskii ezhegodnik teorii prava, no. 1 (2008): 9‑43.
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The topicality and importance of such research is supported by Jane Burbank’s 
judgment that the study of legal history in Russia should be based mainly on the 
conceptions of law developed by Russian intellectuals of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and that the range of ideas they proposed was still topical 
for Russia in the late twentieth century.10
A revival of the understanding of law based on a moral ideal
At the turn of the twentieth century, Russian liberalism entered a new period of devel‑
opment. Its classical form, the political and legal doctrine of which was represented 
by the ideas of Boris Chicherin, Konstantin Kavelin, and Aleksandr Gradovskii, 
was replaced by a trend called “new liberalism.” This term was suggested in 1911 
by the English sociologist Leonard Hobhouse to denote a doctrine rejecting nine‑
teenth‑century classical liberalism with its ideas of a minimal state and freedom 
of the individual from constraints. Besides putting forward the ideas listed above, 
it substantiated the individual’s right to demand minimal social benefits and guar‑
antees of a dignified life from the state. This new type of Russian liberalism was 
aimed at bringing forth progressive changes in political and legal life through 
the development of philosophical and legal theory. The revival of natural law 
became such a theory, and the jurists Pavel Novgorodtsev, Bogdan Kistiakovskii, 
Evgenii Trubetskoi, Vladimir Gessen, Sergei Kotliarevskii, Iosif Pokrovskii, and 
others became its ideologists. The legal doctrine of new liberalism was based on 
the ideas of the rule of law and representative form of governance. The concept of 
“natural,” inviolable, and inalienable civil rights and freedoms lay at its core.
In his description of the ideological spirit of Russian jurisprudence of the early 
twentieth century, Iosif Pokrovskii made his own the words of his well‑known 
contemporary, the German jurist Otto von Gierke: “We must find it, the lost legal 
idea, or we’ll lose ourselves!”11 In Pokrovskii’s opinion, “the spirit of this quest” 
reflected the state of jurisprudence in prerevolutionary Russia, which could not be 
satisfied with studying current legislation, and was doomed without “great ideas” 
and “general truths” and without studying the legal idea. The role of “servant of the 
law” (sluzhanka zakonodatel´stva) did not suit this quest. Using this philosophy, 
the followers of neo‑Kantianism were able to reconsider existing (positive) law 
from the perspective of moral ideals and the category of “necessity,” to contrast 
the existing legal system of the Russian autocracy with the concept of liberal 
judicial reform. 
10. Jane Burbank, “Legal Culture, Citizenship, and Peasant Jurisprudence: Perspectives 
from the Early Twentieth Century,” in Peter H. Solomon, ed., Reforming Justice in Russia, 
1864‑1996: Power, Culture, and The Limits of Legal Order (New York: M.E.  Sharpe, 
1997), 84.
11. I.A.  Pokrovskii, Osnovnye problemy grazhdanskogo prava [Basic issues in civil law] 
(M.: Statut, 1998, originally published in 1917), 75‑76.
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The revival of natural law was typical of jurisprudence in a number of Euro‑
pean countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as France, 
Germany, and Italy. The original version of this theory – the school of natural law 
– dominated European jurisprudence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Among its most prominent representatives were Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, 
Samuel von Pufendorf, John  Locke, Jean‑Jacques  Rousseau. Reflecting on the 
appeal of the natural law theory in Russia and its European forerunners, the Russian 
historian Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kizevetter focused on its two key aspects: 
The social contract doctrine leads us to the conclusion that changing the existing 
political system is possible. […] The doctrine that inherent human rights 
correspond to human nature sets limits to the state’s interference in civil society 
and the citizen’s private life.12
In Russia, the “revived natural law” theory emerged in the mid‑1890s. The legal 
philosophers Leon Petrażycki13 and Pavel Novgorodtsev14 were the first to claim, 
in their works published in 1896 and 1897, that it was necessary to revive natural 
law. The ideology of this trend in legal thought was formulated by Novgorodtsev 
in a 1902 article on moral idealism. The philosopher admitted that current legal 
scholarship was in crisis, that “critical spirit and deep philosophical yearning had 
disappeared […], [that] practical interests prevailed, and work [in legal scholar‑
ship] had become minor, corporate and confined.” In his opinion, the situation 
could be redeemed only by “the revival of natural law with its a priori method, 
ideal aspirations, recognition of the importance of individual autonomy as a moral 
principle and regulatory consideration.”15 In a speech at St.  Petersburg Univer‑
sity in 1902, Novgorodtsev declared war on historicism, positivism, and naturalist 
evolutionism, and defended idealism, moral private autonomy, and the regulatory 
principle. He declared that revival and restoration of “the ideal significance of law, 
its moral principle” were the main tasks of modern legal philosophy. He called for 
a methodological change in the study of law, for a rejection of dogmatic formal 
legal interpretation in favor of normative interpretation, and for consideration of 
12. A.A.  Kizevetter, Istoricheskie ocherki [Historical essays] (M.: Tovarishchestvo 
A.A. Levenson, 1912), 62.
13. L.I. Petrazhitskii [Leon Petrażycki], “Vvedenie v politiku prava [Introduction to the politics 
of law],” Kievskiie Universitetskie Izvestiia, no. 8 (1896), no. 9‑10 (1897).
14. P.I.  Novgorodtsev, Istoricheskaia shkola iuristov, ee proiskhozhdenie i sud´ba: Opyt 
kharakteristiki osnov shkoly Savin´i v ikh posledovatel´nom razvitii [The historical school of 
jurists, its origins and fate: A description of the basic principles of the Savigny School in their 
consistent development] (M.: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1896). 
15. P.I.  Novgorodtsev, “Nravstvennyi idealizm v filisofii prava (K voprosu o vozrozhdenii 
estestvennogo prava) [Moral idealism in legal philosophy (On the issue of reviving natural 
law)],” in O svobode: Antologiia mirovoi liberal´noi mysli (I polovina XX veka) [On freedom: 
An anthology of the world’s liberal thought (first half of the twentieth century)] (M.: Progress 
Traditsiia, 2000), 598, 600‑601, originally published in 1902 in P.I. Novgorodtsev, ed., Prob‑
lemy idealizma [Issues in idealism] (M., 1902), 236‑296.
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law as part of social reality with reference to History, Sociology, Psychology, 
Ethics, and other fields.16
Novgorodtsev referred to the ideas of the distinguished legal philosopher, and 
his oldest contemporary, Vladimir Solov´ev, which were the basis for the concept 
of revived natural law (which the latter enthusiastically supported), and paid special 
attention to the moral value of legal institutions and their importance for moral 
progress. Solov´ev and Novgorodtsev contrasted law based on tyranny and violence 
with law as an expression of justice and freedom.17 According to Solov´ev, law 
could not be understood as an independent principle separate from morality. The 
philosopher defined law as “the lowest limit” or “certain minimum” of morality. At 
the same time, Solov´ev did not oppose natural law to positive law. For him, natural 
law was a synonym of justice (spravedlivost´), which meant freedom and equality; 
positive law was the historical manifestation of law, the true content of any specific 
law and was realized in a certain society to an extent that was determined by its 
degree of moral consciousness. 
The methodological basis for the “revived natural law” doctrine in Russia was 
the philosophy of Neo‑Kantianism, based on the concept of the dialectic of das 
Sein and das Sollen, and the need to study social phenomena in two ways: as they 
are, and as they should be. It was the revival of philosophical individualism visible 
in Germany in the early 1860s, which called for a return to Kant, and then of the 
Neo‑Kantian movement, which finally led to the revival of the idea of natural 
rights. As the legal scholar Bogdan Kistiakovskii, an eminent representative of the 
Neo‑Kantian movement in Russia, wrote in his main work, published in 1916: 
The idea of natural law has been revived in a new formula […]. It is this idea, 
critically checked and purified by Neo‑Kantianism, that serves as one of the 
ideological foundations for guaranteeing human rights.18 
On the basis of this philosophy, natural law revivalists tried to draw a distinction 
between das Sein and das Sollen, and assess reality (notably, the legal system and 
political regime of autocratic Russia) from the standpoint of how things ought to 
be (a moral ideal, specific embodiments of which include the establishment of the 
rule‑of‑law state and securing the rights and freedoms of the individual).
Natural law is a synonym of how things ought to be in law, wrote Evgenii 
Trubetskoi, a member of the new school. It is a moral basis for any specific legal 
16. Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, 302‑310. 
17. P.I.  Novgorodtsev, Ideiia prava v filosofii Vl.S.  Solov´eva [The idea of law in 
Vl.S. Solov’ev’s philosophy] (M.: Tipo‑litografiia Tovarishchestva I.N. Kushnerevi K., 1901), 
17, 19.
18. B.A. Kistiakovskii, “Sotsial´nye nauki i pravo. Ocherki po metodologii sotsial´nykh nauk 
i obshchei teorii prava [Social sciences and law. Essays on the methodologies of the social 
sciences and general law theory],” in B.A. Kistiakovskii, Izbrannye trudy [Selected works], 
Vol. 1 (M.: ROSSPEN, 2010), 479, originally published in 1916.
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order […], an appeal to improve the current law. It is a prerequisite for progress 
and development in law. Progress, i.e., the progressive advance of law towards 
good, is possible only insofar as positive law is subject to a higher moral or 
natural law, which serves as its basis and criterion.19 
Ivan Il´in, another representative of this school, pointed out that natural law was 
based on the requirements of justice: 
The relationship between law and morality can be formed rightly and wrongly. 
The right relationship between them exists only when law, without exceeding its 
limits, conforms to the requirements of morality and is a preparatory stage and 
support for it…20. 
Il´in considered positive law to be “an imperfect manifestation or an immature 
formula of natural law” which was to “take the content of natural law and display it 
as a number of rules of external behavior adapted to the specific conditions of life 
and the requirements of a specific time.”21
However, the natural law theory required that renovation and improvement 
in Russia become a generator of social reforms. This brought about the theory of 
“natural law with changeable content” (estestvennoe pravo s izmenchivym soder‑
zhaniem). Suggested by Rudolf  Stammler, a supporter of Neo‑Kantianism, and 
Boris  Chicherin in the second half of the nineteenth century, and found partly 
in Kant’s works, this theory was brought into being by the urge to overcome the 
dualism of views in the old school of natural law, which contrasted natural law with 
positive law. Chicherin predicted the gradual harmonization of positive law and 
natural law in the course of the historical development of society and the creation of 
a social order under which individual political freedom would achieve its comple‑
tion.22 The renewal of the natural law concept in the late nineteenth and early twen‑
tieth centuries in the form of revived natural law made it less vulnerable to criticism 
by its opponents, the supporters of positivistic theories. 
19. E.I.  Trubetskoi, Entsiklopediia prava [Encyclopedia of law] (M.: Skoropechatnia 
A.A. Levenson, 1908), 59.
20. I.A. Il´in, “Obshchee uchenie o prave i gosudarstve,” in Osnovy zakonovedeniia: Obsh‑
chee uchenie o prave i gosudarstve i osnovnye poniatiia russkogo gosudarstvennogo, grazh‑
danskogo i ugolovnogo prava [Fundamentals of law: General doctrine of law and state and 
the basic concepts of the Russian state, civil and criminal law] (M.: Izdanie Tovarishchestva 
V.V. Dumnov, 1915), 32‑33.
21. I.A.  Il´in, O sushchnosti pravosoznaniia [On legal consciousness] (Munich: Tipografia 
Obiteli Prepodobnogo Iova Pochaevskogo, 1956), 44, 46.
22. B.N. Chicherin, Sobstvennost´ i gosudarstvo [Property and state], part 1 (M.: Тipografiia 
Pravitel´stvuiushchego Senata, 1881), 87.
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The concept of the individual and the individual’s fundamental rights  
and freedoms
The concept of the individual formed the basis for the natural law revivalists’ legal 
theory. At the beginning of the twentieth century in Russia, revived natural law 
became a science expressing “the absolute significance of the individual, which 
should belong to the individual in any form of political system.”23
January 1905 saw the first issue of the literary‑social journal Voprosy zhizni 
edited by the philosopher Nikolai Losskii. In this first issue, the journal published 
Kistiakovskii’s article about the rights of man and of the citizen, which was a policy 
statement, because it formulated the task of establishing a constitutional order in 
Russia and admitted the utmost significance of the individual and his or her rights. 
Kistiakovskii called for the recognition of the significance of individuals, for 
imbuing them with the awareness of their rights, and for inducing them to struggle 
for their rights. The legal scholar proposed that all citizens, including those who 
were not supporters of the natural law theory, should be aware of the fact that “the 
individual has inalienable rights that cannot be violated by the state.”24
In 1908, Kistiakovskii wrote:
State interests in no way should take over the interests of certain individuals. The 
individual is not simply a means for the state […]. When the individual is just 
a means for the state, the state becomes a despot whose power grows into pure 
lawlessness. Such despotism is typical of an absolute monarchy state. Interests 
of the state and authority here are everything, while the individual is nothing. A 
state becomes constitutional only if the following principle is established: the 
individual exists independently of the state and has priority over it.25
The main message of Kistiakovskii’s doctrine consisted in the substantiation of the 
further development of individual freedoms in an unfree society, and in upholding 
the legal ethics of “subjective public rights.”26 Kistiakovskii’s recognition of the 
fact that civil rights theory was a significant part of the conception of a rule‑of‑law 
state was an important contribution to the development of national law.27 
23. Novgorodtsev, Nravstvennyi idealizm v filosofii prava, 636.
24. B.A. Kistiakovskii, “Prava cheloveka i grazhdanina [The rights of man and of the citizen],” 
Voprosy zhizni, no. 1 (1905): 123, 142.
25. B.A.  Kistiakovskii, “Gosudarstvennoe pravo (obshchee i russkoe). Lektsii 
B.A.  Kistiakovskogo, chitannye v Moskovskom kommercheskom institute v 1908/1909 
akademicheskom godu [State law (general and Russian). Lectures by B.A.  Kistiakovskii, 
delivered at the Moscow Institute of Commerce in the 1908‑1909 academic year],” in 
B.A. Kistiakovskii, Izbrannye raboty [Selected works] part 2 (M.: ROSSPEN, 2010), 191.
26. Medushevskii, Dialog so vremenem, 383.
27. Susan Heuman, Kistiakovskii: The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in 
the Last Years of Tsarism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 65; Walicki, Legal 
Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, 367.
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Kistiakovskii insisted that public authority should recognize the rights of the indi‑
vidual as immutable and inviolable and establish them de jure. He considered the 
declarations of civil rights of the eighteenth century – especially the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 in France – to be significant acts 
which marked a real turning point in the development of modern legal conscious‑
ness in western countries and the Russian Empire.28
While substantiating the principle that civil rights are absolute and inalienable, 
representatives of the “revived natural law” school also developed a model of the 
relationship between the individual and public authority. They argued that the indi‑
vidual is vested with autonomy, the right of privacy, and the guarantees of state 
protection in case of violation of his or her rights and liberties. Public authority’s 
obligation of non‑interference in individual freedom means that the individual has 
the right to such non‑interference, a right that can be defended in court. According 
to Vladimir Gessen, an eminent supporter of the natural law revival, the following 
principle was in force for the individual: “Everything which is not forbidden by law 
is permitted.” A different principle applied for the authorities: “Everything which is 
not permitted by law is forbidden.”29
The concept of subjective public rights
The concept of subjective public rights served the purpose of consolidating civil 
rights theory in state (constitutional) law. This concept was created by the German 
legal scholars Rudolf von Ihering and Georg Jellinek. As Jellinek argued, subjec‑
tive public rights were something that citizens could demand for themselves from 
the state. Thus they were not limited to the “passive status” (status passivus) that 
Jellinek identified as their basic status, the status of subjects entirely submitted 
to the state’s authority. Jellinek postulated the priority of the individual’s public 
rights and claimed that the state should refrain from any actions that might prevent 
the individual from exercising his or her freedoms.30
Russian jurists were influenced by this concept and developed it further. In the 
“revived natural law” theory, the notion of “subjective public rights” was widely 
used. One of the most comprehensive definitions of subjective public rights was 
given in 1907 by Sergei Kotliarevskii, an expert on state law. For Kotliarevskii, this 
28. Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, 367.
29. V.M. Gessen, Administrativnoe pravo [Administrative law] (SPb.: Тipografiia М.М. Stasi‑
ulevicha, 1903), 27; V.M. Gessen, O pravovom gosudarstve [On the rule‑of‑law state] (SPb.: 
Izdanie N. Glagoleva, 1906), 24‑26.
30. Georg Jellinek, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens: A Contribution to 
Modern Constitutional History (New York: Holt, 1901), 6, 28 (originally published in 1895 
as Die Erklärung der Menschen‑ und Bürgerrechte); Georg Iellinek [Georg Jellinek], Obsh‑
chee uchenie o gosudarstve [General doctrine of law] (SPb.: Iuridichesky Center Press, 2004, 
originally published in 1903), 406. See also: Rudolf von Ihering, “Law as a Means to an End,” 
in Modern Legal Philosophy Series, vol. V. (Boston: The Boston Book Company, 1913, trans‑
lated from the German by Isaak Husek): 66‑67, 108, 242.
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notion meant that each member of a state has a certain sphere of life and activity that 
is protected from encroachment by the authorities.31 Russian jurists working during 
the great constitutional reforms were both theoretically and practically minded 
and were intent on applying this notion concretely. Therefore, when speaking 
about the subjective public rights of the individual, they meant that the existence 
of a rule‑of‑law state was a condition for their implementation. Kistiakovskii, for 
instance, pointed to the inviolability of subjective public rights in a rule‑of‑law state 
deprived of the opportunity to restrain or violate these rights.32
In his book written in 1906, Gessen also connected the category of subjective 
public rights with a rule‑of‑law state in which the individual becomes a subject 
of public rights and duties, i.e., a citizen (grazhdanin), while in a police state, 
which aims at total control over the lives of its subjects, the individual is only an 
object of authority, i.e., a subject (poddannyi).33 The elaboration of the theories 
of subjecthood (poddanstvo) and citizenship (grazhdanstvo) and the identification 
of the essential differences between a subject (poddannyi) and a citizen (grazh‑
danin) are some of this scholar’s considerable achievements. Gessen used the term 
subjecthood (poddanstvo) to denote that the individual belongs to the state, and 
the term citizenship (grazhdanstvo) to convey that people are equal members of 
civil society in an ideal state where everyone “is a subject of a certain category of 
rights, notably political rights.”34 Following the Kantian das Sein and das Sollen 
theory, Gessen found citizenship (grazhdanstvo) an ideal that ought to be (das 
Sollen), while subjecthood (poddanstvo) was the existing reality (das Sein). He 
argued that Russian legislation, institutions, and traditions could serve as matrices 
for the evolutionary transition from subjects (poddannye) deprived of rights to citi‑
zens (grazhdane) vested with rights. Gessen’s attempt to place rights at the core of 
the concept of citizenship, in contrast to the political and legal reality existing in 
Russia, where duties towards the state union prevailed, was one of his major intel‑
lectual accomplishments. He claimed that the individual could not be secondary in 
relation to the state and its laws, and that civil rights were of a universal nature.35
The Russian representatives of the “revived natural law” school used the theory of 
the individual’s three statuses that Georg Jellinek developed to show how the initial 
“passive status” had been historically overcome. Jellinek posited that the devel‑
opment of individualism in the course of the transformation of relations between 
the individual and the state throughout history was continuous and progressive. 
31. S.A.  Kotliarevskii, Konstitutsionnoe gosudarstvo: Opyt politiko‑morfologicheskogo 
obzora [The constitutional state: A political and morphological review] (SPb.: Izdanie 
G.F. L´vovicha, 1907), 80.
32. Kistiakovskii, Prava cheloveka i grazhdanina, 117.
33. Gessen, O pravovom gosudarstve, 23‑24.
34. V.M. Gessen, Poddanstvo: Ego ustanovlenie i prekrashchenie [Subjecthood: Its establish‑
ment and cancelation], vol. 1 (SPb.: Pravda, 1909), 116.
35. Eric Lohr, “The Ideal Citizen and the Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia,” Kritika: Explo‑
rations in Russian and Eurasian History, 7, 2 (2006), 182.
 THE LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA 801
He interpreted the negative status of rights (status negativus) as the individual’s 
free self‑determination and expression of will (free from interference on the part of 
the state). Among negative status rights, he included freedoms born in the course 
of the struggle with official repression, such as freedom of conscience and of the 
press, the security of private residence, and the right to meeting and assembly . He 
saw the positive status of rights (status positivus) as one that provided its bearers 
with claims for the state to act on their behalf. In Jellinek’s classification, the active 
status (status activus) was closely connected with the positive status; it allowed the 
individual to become involved in society and exercise his or her public rights as 
guaranteed by law. The positive status outlined the area of potential activity, while 
the active status was a sphere for exercising civil legal capacity. The active status 
of rights included, for example, the right to participate through election in the work 
of state bodies.36
Following Jellinek, Russian natural law revivalists determined a universal 
set of civil rights and freedoms and worked out their classification. One of the 
most comprehensive and logically coherent Russian versions of the catalogue of 
rights was created by Vladimir Gessen. He singled out three categories of subjec‑
tive public rights. The first one included the rights of freedom (prava svobody). 
By guaranteeing these rights, the state authority recognized that a citizen had a 
certain sphere of freedom in which it was not to interfere (“negative status rights”). 
Gessen’s view on this category of rights was close to Jellinek’s. Under authori‑
tarian regimes, these rights are most severely trampled on by the state power, while 
constitutional states protect them and proclaim them to be the integral rights of 
the individual and the citizen. This category included basic civil freedoms guar‑
anteed by declarations of rights and constitutions, such as the freedom of belief, 
speech, press, meeting, assembly, travel, trade, occupation and others. The second 
category of rights, i.e., the positive public rights of the individual or the rights to 
services from the state authority, included the rights to judicial protection (the right 
to sue), social protection (social welfare), and education (“positive status rights”). 
By active status rights, the legal philosopher meant the rights to implement govern‑
ment (political rights): the active and passive right to vote, the hereditary right 
to membership in the upper chamber, the right to be elected to the Chamber of 
Deputies, the right to be a juror, etc.37 When compiling his catalogue, Gessen took 
Jellinek’s into consideration. However, Gessen gave a more detailed and compre‑
hensive definition of negative status rights and their types. Thus, he included the 
freedom of movement (svoboda peredvizheniia) and occupation (svoboda zaniatii), 
which were not fully guaranteed for peasants. He also highlighted the role of the 
state in granting individual rights and freedoms. The state Gessen had in mind was 
36. Iellinek, Obshchee uchenie o gosudarstve, 406‑408; E.B.  Levental´, “Vklad Georga 
Iellineka v razvitie instituta osnovnykh prav i svobod [Georg Jellinek’s contribution to devel‑
oping the institution of basic rights and freedoms],” Pravo i politika, no. 2 (2007): 75‑83.
37. V.M. Gessen, Osnovy konstitutsionnogo prava [Fundamentals of constitutional law] (SPb.: 
Izdanie iuridicheskogo knizhnogo sklada “Pravo,” 1918), 87‑89.
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the authoritarian Russian state he lived in, which had a prospect for transformation 
into a constitutional state after 1905.
While Gessen considered the rights and liberties of every category to be equally 
important, Kistiakovskii ranked them in order of significance. He claimed that 
the most essential right of the individual was the right of personal inviolability, 
and also the right of inviolability of home and correspondence; without them, all 
other civil rights seemed illusive. In a rule‑of‑law state, personal inviolability was 
protected by the bodies of state power, which acted within strict legal boundaries. 
Kistiakovskii analyzed how the catalogues of rights in the legislations of Euro‑
pean countries (England, France, Germany) and the US expanded and found an 
important trend in the development of subjective rights: their transformation from 
national rights into the universal rights of the individual and the citizen.38
Russian natural law revivalists also actualized the positive rights concept. 
A package of new social rights was included in the concept of the right to a digni‑
fied life (pravo na dostoinoe chelovecheskoe sushchestvovanie) developed by 
Vladimir Solov´ev at the end of the nineteenth century. Solov´ev understood it as the 
right of any individual to have secure means of subsistence and sufficient physical 
rest, which provided conditions for spiritual improvement.39 Novgorodtsev made 
a considerable contribution to the development of this concept. He interpreted the 
right to a dignified life extremely broadly, as the possibility of a dignified life guar‑
anteed by the state to people suffering from economic dependence, lack of money, 
and unfavorable life circumstances. Inclusion of the right to a dignified life in the 
declaration of rights, in Novgorodtsev’s opinion, led to such juridical consequences 
as the recognition of the right to social security in case of illness, disability and old 
age for every worker; the recognition of the right to work; the recognition of the right 
to a certain standard of living; the recognition of the right of individuals united by 
common interests and mutual support to form trade unions; and the recognition of 
the rights of helpless and disabled people to obligatory government and non‑gov‑
ernment care. Novgorodtsev considered factory laws to be a mechanism for imple‑
menting the right to a dignified life, and he believed that their purpose was to protect 
the interests of working people by guaranteeing them the right to social security in 
case of illness, old age and disability, by regulating working conditions, etc.40 
Novgorodtsev suggested including statements about recognizing the right to a 
dignified life, to work, and to the normal application of labor in the program of the 
Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party, of which he was one of the founders. 
Later on, these issues were discussed in the Juridical Council of the Provisional 
38. B.A. Kistiakovskii, Filosofiia i sotsiologiia prava [Philosophy and sociology of law] (SPb.: 
Izd‑vo Russkogo khristianskogo gumanitarnogo instituta, 1999), 545.
39. V.S. Solov´ev, Pravo i nravstvennost´: Ocherki iz prikladnoi etiki [Law and morality: 
Essays on applied ethics] (SPb.: Izd‑vo Ia. Kantorovicha, 1899), 20.
40. P.I.  Novgorodtsev, “Pravo na dostoinoe chelovecheskoe sushchestvovanie [The right 
to a dignified human existence],” in Sotsial´no‑filosofskie etiudy P.I.  Novgorodtseva i 
I.A. Pokrovskogo [Social and philosophical essays by P.I. Novgorodtsev and I.A. Pokrovskii] 
(SPb. – M.: Izd‑vo Tovarishchestva M.O. Vol´f, 1911), 5‑6.
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Government, while the declaration of rights for the future constitution was being 
prepared for the Constituent Assembly. Novgorodtsev’s ideas about the right 
to social security in case of illness and disability were further developed in the 
bills “On social security for workers in case of illness” and “On insuring workers 
against accidents,” which were introduced by P.A.  Stolypin’s government into 
the State Duma in 1908. The workers’ right to professional self‑organization that 
Novgorodtsev advocated was secured in the Decree on Societies and Unions of 
4 March 1906. 
Novgorodtsev did not see any serious contradiction between classical civil 
rights and new social rights. However, he warned against dangerous destructive 
illusions, such as the idea of establishing paradise on earth, which, in his opinion, 
could be caused by the struggle of Russian revolutionaries for social rights.41 This 
legal philosopher was one of the first to speak of the dangers associated with radical 
utopian ideologies that had the potential for mastering minds and claiming the status 
of the only true ideology, which was particularly topical for the twentieth century. 
Meanwhile, Kistiakovskii was led by his theoretical concept of public‑legal 
subjective rights to the idea of a socialist state as a new and higher stage of the 
rule‑of‑law state. He argued that the task of this state was to broaden the sphere 
of subjective public rights, which, in his opinion, would significantly change 
the position of citizens in the country and make them enjoy full rights. As the 
jurist predicted in his famous article in the Vekhi collection, only in a socialist 
state would all the members of society possess the greatest degree of freedom 
of activity and self‑determination, and would political bodies get an exact legal 
formulation.42 Kistiakovskii prophetically suggested that the socialist state would 
develop the right to work (interpreted as the right to use the land and other means 
of production), the resulting right to develop one’s abilities and apply one’s labor 
to the sphere best corresponding to those abilities, and the right to participate in the 
material and spiritual values created by culture. He subsumed these rights under 
what he called the“right to a dignified life” (pravo na dostoinoe chelovecheskoe 
sushchestvovanie), which was to be guaranteed to every person and provided by 
the state. It is evident that the jurist’s ideas of the socialist state were purely theo‑
retical and highly idealized. In his other works, he called a state that protected 
the joint interests of people and the common good a “socially oriented state” 
(sotsial´noe gosudarstvo).43 The natural law revivalists were credited for the cata‑
logue of human rights and freedoms and the elaboration of a system of subjective 
public rights. Developing the theory of subjective public rights in early twentieth‑ 
century Russia during the expanding movement for legislative guarantees of civil 
41. Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, 328.
42. B.A.  Kistiakovskii, “V zashchitu prava (Intelligentsiia i pravosoznanie) [In defense of 
law (Intelligentsia and legal consciousness],” in Vekhi: Sbornik statei o russkoi intelligentsii 
[Landmarks: A collection of articles about Russian intelligentsia] (M.: Tipograpfiia Sablina, 
1909), 113.
43. Kistiakovskii, “Sotsial´nye nauki i pravo…,” 543‑545.
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rights, which was led by liberal social activists through their publications, organ‑
izations and other institutions, Neo‑Kantians were in a hurry to transform natural 
rights from the “das Sollen” category to the “das Sein”; in Kistiakovskii’s words, 
they tried “to pass from theory to practice, from examining the theoretical meaning 
of subjective public rights and their system to recognizing them in legislation and 
implementing them in reality.”44
“Freedoms will be permanent in Russia only when they are guaranteed”
Kistiakovskii, who delivered a course of lectures on state law in the 1908‑1909 
academic year, claimed that in order to make civil freedoms formal and juridical, 
“it is not sufficient to have only laws on freedoms; we also need good laws on 
the responsibility of officials.” These laws will give any citizen whose subjective 
public right is violated an opportunity to initiate a criminal or civil action against 
the official who violated it by advancing a claim for damages.45
The civil rights theory of the natural law revivalists was fully developed thanks 
to the system of guarantees of rights elaborated by its representatives. The theorists 
of the “revived natural law” school believed that the protection of subjective rights 
and the creation of conditions for their implementation were the basic function of 
the rule‑of‑law state. They formulated a system for guaranteeing these rights. They 
interpreted the state’s ability to secure the rights of its citizens as a sign that the 
state was restricted by law, that it was governed by law. By contrast, they did not 
consider a state in which public authority could abolish basic rights and freedoms at 
its sole discretion to be governed by law. Kistiakovskii wrote:
These freedoms are an inalienable right for every individual, so that the state 
system in which they are violated cannot be considered normal […]. Where 
these freedoms do not exist or […] can be abolished at least temporarily […], the 
state authority is violent and not law‑based by nature.46
The natural law revivalist theorists associated the establishment of the system 
of guarantees of civil rights with the introduction of the constitutional system in 
Russia. They joined a discussion on the significance of the 1905‑1906 state reform, 
whose main landmarks were the adoption of the Manifesto of 17 October 1905, 
which proclaimed that people were granted civil freedoms and a representative 
body, and the publication of a new edition of the “Fundamental Laws (Osnovnye 
44. Kistiakovskii, “Gosudarstvennoe pravo (obshchee i russkoe)…,” 204.
45. Ibid., 247.
46. B.A.  Kistiakovskii, Sushchnost´ gosudarstvennoi vlasti [The essence of state power] 
(Yaroslavl´: Тipografiia Gubernskogo pravleniia, 1913), 474, 479; Id., Filosofiia i sotsiologiia 
prava, 328.
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zakony) of the Russian Empire” of 23 April 1906, which contained a chapter on 
civil and political rights.
Jurists divided into two camps in their assessment of the legal significance of 
the above‑mentioned acts. The first camp was comprised of skeptics who did not 
recognize the Manifesto of 17 October as an act that introduced a new legal system. 
They interpreted it as merely a declaration of the supreme authority’s intentions 
to transform the Russian state system on the basis of the rule‑of‑law state. Thus, 
Moscow University Professor of State Law Fedor Kokoshkin described the Mani‑
festo as an act that introduced no significant changes into Russian state law; it “just 
showed the way for the reform to go.”47 Another part of the legal community iden‑
tified the Manifesto with the Constitution. Kistiakovskii became convinced that the 
1905‑1906 reform in Russia introduced a constitutional system as well as subjec‑
tive public rights for citizens. 
In Russia, before the 1905‑1906 state reform, the individual did not have any 
subjective rights in relation to the state. […] This led […] to the suppression of 
individual rights by the state and the authorities. That is why we can speak about 
the “rights of man and of the citizen” only beginning with the Manifesto of 17 
October 1905.48
The system of civil right guarantees created by Russian legal thinkers at the begin‑
ning of the twentieth  century did not differ very much from the three types of 
subjective right guarantees formulated by Georg  Jellinek. Jellinek distinguished 
social (he included here religion, morals, and social customs), political (separation 
of powers, local government, etc.), and legal guarantees (responsibility of minis‑
ters, impeachment, administrative justice, etc.). According to Jellinek, legal guar‑
antees were primarily realized through the supervising function of the state, which 
exercised administrative, financial and parliamentary types of control.49 
Russian natural law revivalists such as Gessen, Kotliarevskii, and others saw 
four ways – political, social, material and legal – of guaranteeing rights. According 
to them, political guarantees included separation of powers and the by‑law nature 
of the judicial and administrative branches of power; social guarantees included 
the state of social mores, morals and the legal consciousness of the public; mate‑
rial guarantees included personal economic independence; and legal guarantees 
47. F.F. Kokoshkin, “Iuridicheskaia priroda Manifesta 17 oktiabria, [The juridical nature of the 
October 17 Manifesto],” Iuridicheskii vestnik, no. 1 (1913), 43.
48. Kistiakovskii, Gosudarstvennoe pravo (obshchee i russkoe), 228, 231‑233, 237, 246. See 
also Marc Szeftel’s analysis of the controversy about the interpretation of the institutional 
change after the October Manifesto: Marc Szeftel, The Russian Constitution of April 23, 1906: 
Political Institutions of the Duma Monarchy (Bruxelles – Luxembourg: Les Éditions de la 
Librairie Encyclopédique, 1976), 202‑211, 236‑242, 264‑66.
49. Iellinek, Obshchee uchenie o gosudarstve, 745‑750.
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included administrative justice, constitutional supervision, and the responsibility of 
ministers and other officials before legislative and judicial powers.50
Vladimir Gessen’s political conception was the most original and interesting 
among those of his colleagues from the “revived natural law” school as concerns 
the Russian case. It was a variant of the classical conception of the separation of 
powers created in the Early Modern period. It often employed the phrase “separa‑
tion of powers” (obosoblenie vlastei), by which the author meant the precedence 
of the legislative branch over the executive branch and the adherence to law by 
the executive and judicial branches. This point was very significant for Russian 
executive and judicial powers during the constitutional reform in 1905 and 1906. 
According to Gessen, the separation of powers was a fundamental guarantee of 
subjective public rights, and a key indicator of the rule‑of‑law state. Gessen pointed 
out that in the rule‑of‑law state only the legislative power, which expressed the will 
of the people, was not restricted by the current law in carrying out its prerogatives. 
Adherence to law by the executive and judicial powers was a component of the 
state’s self‑restriction, since the state, by issuing a law, restricted not only subor‑
dinate individuals but also itself. Thus, both the state, represented by the executive 
power, and any citizen, dependent on it, were legal entities, i.e., bearers of objective 
obligations and rights.51
Following the lead of German jurisprudence of the second half of the nineteenth 
century, which assigned key positions in the system of legal guarantees of subjec‑
tive rights to the judicial power, natural law revivalists developed a doctrine of 
administrative justice. Administrative justice was to play a key role in guaranteeing 
civil rights. Russian legal thinkers understood it as judicial control over the legality 
of acts issued by administrative bodies and protection of the citizen’s right to bring 
a complaint to judicial authorities about the administration’s actions.
In the theoretical developments of prerevolutionary legal scholars, the idea of 
administrative justice was a derivative of the principle of separation of powers 
exercised in the rule‑of‑law state. Thus, by “administrative justice,” Gessen meant 
“a specific and separate organization of the judicial power designed to protect 
subjective public rights by cancelling unlawful orders of the executive power.”52 
In theoretical disputes about the essence of administrative justice, the need for a 
special administrative court, and the transfer of supervision over the legality of 
administrative acts and decisions to courts of general jurisdiction, Gessen took a 
definitive stand. He supported the establishment of an independent judicial body 
to strike down any unlawful decree of the executive power. The investigation of a 
conflict between an individual and the authorities, arising from administrative law, 
50. V.M. Gessen, “Teoriia pravovogo gosudarstva [Theory of the rule‑of‑law state],” in Politi‑
cheskii stroi sovremennykh gosudarstv [The political system of contemporary states] (SPb.: 
Izd‑vo kn. P.D. Dolgorukova i I.I. Petrunkevicha pri uchastii redaktsii gazety “Pravo,” 1905), 
140‑143; S.A. Kotliarevskii, Vlast´ i pravo: Problema pravovogo gosudarstva [Power and law: 
The rule‑of‑law state issue] (M.: Tipografiia “Mysl´”, 1915), 287‑288.
51. Gessen, O pravovom gosudarstve, 12.
52. Gessen, Osnovy konstitutsionnogo prava, 90‑91. 
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demanded from the judge, in the scholar’s opinion, a special – administrative, but 
not private‑law – knowledge, which meant that an ordinary civil court could not 
be charged with this task.53 Describing the status of administrative courts, Gessen 
claimed that they should rest upon the following important principles: independ‑
ence of administrative judges from the administration (as was the case with civil 
judges), irremovability of judges, the collective nature of the court, and adversarial, 
public legal proceedings. Gessen called this type of administrative justice “the 
Archimedean lever of the rule‑of‑law state.”54
In the juridical literature of that time, as well as in today’s works on Russian 
administrative law, the concept of administrative justice as a special form of judi‑
cial power was not generally recognized. The German jurist Rudolf Gneist, for 
instance, believed that administrative justice was a continuation of administrative 
power and was intended for its self‑control.55 British jurists rejected the notion of 
administrative justice. Albert Dicey, for example, was of the opinion that, if prob‑
lems related to administrative functioning were to be settled by a special jurisdic‑
tion, it would take them out of the general court system and give an advantage to the 
state over individuals.56 Meanwhile, Russian legal theory considerably outstripped 
the institutionalization of administrative justice. In 1917 the Provisional Govern‑
ment’s project to create special administrative courts was based precisely on the 
concept of administrative justice developed by Russian natural law revivalists.57
One of the most widely discussed issues in the early twentieth century among 
legal scholars was the expedience of introducing an institution for constitutional 
supervision with the power of judicial review. Sergei Kotliarevskii took an active 
role in this discussion. The activity of the US Supreme Court, which reviewed the 
constitutionality of laws and had a great impact on constitutional development in 
the US, was a positive example for him. According to him, the very possibility 
of verifying a law’s compliance with the fundamental law provided a guarantee 
against the violation of the constitution by the legislature.58
Russian legal thinkers also considered that instituting responsibilities for minis‑
ters and other officials was a legal guarantee of individual rights. They considered 
that the responsibility of ministers to the parliament, that is, the responsibility of the 
executive power to the legislative power, was a guarantee of adherence to law by 
53. Gessen, O pravovom gosudarstve, 46.
54. Gessen, Teoriia pravovogo gosudarstva, 141.
55. Rudolf Gneist, Istoriia gosudarstvennikh uchrezhdenii Anglii [History of state institu‑
tions in England] (M.: K.T. Soldatenkov, 1885, originally published in Germany in 1882 as 
Englische Verfassungsgeschichte), 762‑776.
56. Albert Dicey, “The Development of Administrative Law in England,” Law Quarterly 
Review, 31 (1915): 151‑153.
57. E.A. Pravilova, Zakonnost´ i prava lichnosti: administrativnaia iustitsiia v Rossii (vtoraia 
polovina XIX v. – oktiabr´ 1917 g.) [Legality and individual rights: Administrative justice 
in Russia (second half of the nineteenth century – October  1917] (SPb.: Izd‑vo SZAGS, 
2000), 251.
58. Kotliarevskii, Vlast´ i pravo, 287‑288.
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the governmental power in rule‑of‑law states. According to Gessen, constitutional 
ministries were to be accountable to the monarch and parliament.59 The Russian 
experience of a Duma‑ruled monarchy confirmed the validity of the jurists’ posi‑
tion that the accountability of ministers to the representative body was the key state‑
ment of the constitutional state.60 
Kotliarevskii, like Gessen, ranked the protection of civil rights in court first 
among the guarantees of civil rights in a constitutional state.61 The responsibility 
of ministers to the people for their violations of law ranked second. Kotliarevskii 
considered the state of society’s juridical consciousness to be no less significant a 
guarantee of individual rights and freedoms. In his opinion, the system of guaran‑
teeing subjective rights was effective only “if the whole nation was aware of the 
importance of these individual rights, of the great danger coming from the violation 
of the rights by the state authority, and was ready to protect them.”62
In his statement of the question about the legal consciousness of society as a 
condition for the insurance of subjective rights, Kotliarevskii was a true expo‑
nent of the position of the “revived natural law” school, which considered legal 
consciousness to be the source for the development of law and statehood. This posi‑
tion was a result of the natural law school’s general views on the sources of law. 
Kistiakovskii thought that the main problem in Russia was the intelligentsia’s lack 
of a firm legal consciousness, nihilistic attitude to objective law and order, and 
indifference towards individual rights, as well as to institutions that protected them 
(such as civil courts, popular representation, etc.). In his famous article in Vekhi, 
the scholar wrote: 
The Russian intelligentsia consists of people who are not disciplined, 
either individually or socially. This is explained by the fact that the Russian 
intelligentsia has never respected law, has never seen it as valuable; of all 
cultural values law has always been the least recognized.63 
Novgorodtsev considered legal consciousness to be the source and roots of life in 
the state. He regarded social legal consciousness, which included people’s moral 
consciousness and moral ideas about the state and state order, as a key factor for 
59. Gessen, Teoriia pravovogo gosudarstva, 142‑143; Id., Osnovy konstitutsionnogo prava, 
393, 396‑397.
60. Lack of responsible government is considered by researchers to be one of the most vulner‑
able spots of the Russian Duma monarchy: K.A. Solov´ev, Zakonodatel´naia i ispolnitel´naia 
vlast´ v Rossii: mekhanizmy vzaimodeistviia (1906‑1914) [Legislative and executive power 
in Russia: Mechanisms of interaction] (M.: Rossiiskaia politicheskaia entsiklopediia, 2011), 
136‑140; I.V.  Lukoianov, U istokov rossiiskogo parlamentarizma [The sources of Russian 
parliamentarism] (SPb.: Liki Rossii, 2003), 81.
61. For Kotliarevskii, rule‑of‑law state and constitutional state were not synonymous. He 
considered that the rule‑of‑law state was an idea that did not apply in Russian conditions.
62. Kotliarevskii, Konstitutsionnoe gosudarstvo: Opyt politiko‑morfologicheskogo obzora, 
99‑100.
63. Kistiakovskii, “V zashchitu prava,” 102.
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exercising subjective rights, and for the consolidation and recognition of these 
rights by the legislature.64
Legal consciousness was the core of Ivan Il´in’s philosophy. In a report at the 
meeting of the Moscow Juridical Society in 1916, Il´in said that the essence of 
normal legal consciousness (in his later works he wrote about mature natural legal 
consciousness as an ideal type of legal consciousness) consisted not only in exact 
knowledge of positive law but also in independent, autonomous recognition of its 
objective importance, and also in the will to establish a social organization based 
on freedom, equality and self‑government. According to Il´in, the spread of normal 
legal consciousness was supposed to contribute to bringing positive law nearer to 
natural law and gradually make positive law unnecessary.65
Thus, the doctrine of the guarantee of rights, which was developed by the Russian 
theorists of the “revived natural law” school in the early twentieth century, drew on 
the ideas of German thinkers of the second half of the nineteenth century on the 
essence of the guarantees of subjective rights, and reflected the Russian experience 
of building a rule‑of‑law state, as well as ensuring the rights of the individual in a 
state that was undergoing a transition from the authoritarian to the rule‑of‑law type.
The influence of the natural law doctrine on the elaboration  
of new legal forms
When he explained the reasons for reviving natural law, Pavel Novgorodtsev noted 
a connection between the natural law doctrine and the creation of new legal forms 
and pointed to the urgent need that invariably leads to natural law schemes. He 
called it the need to “go towards the future and realize […] ideal aspirations and 
hopes in it.” According to the philosopher, this need was most evident in periods 
of crisis, when old forms of life proved to be obsolete, and society felt an insatiable 
desire for a new order. This desire for something new generated “a constant dissat‑
isfaction with existing law which hasn’t changed yet” and “a demand for better, 
ideal, natural law.”66
As the Russian form of government evolved towards a constitutional one, the 
ideas of the “revived natural law” school set the direction of law reform and its theo‑
retical content. The individual freedoms issue came to the foreground in jurispru‑
dential literature with the publication of the Manifesto of 17 October 1905, which 
declared civil freedoms. The ideas and values of human rights were expressed in 
scientific and journalistic works written by members of the liberal professoriate who 
were sympathetic to the demand for civil liberties and saw their task as explaining 
64. P.I. Novgorodtsev, “Pravo i gosudarstvo [Law and State],” Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, 
no. 74, 4 (1904): 535.
65. “V iuridicheskom obshchestve [In a law society],” Russkie vedomosti (14 December 1916): 
6.
66. Novgorodtsev, “Nravstvennyi idealizm v filisofii prava,” 250. 
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their significance to the society. Law professionals, such as Vladimir  Gessen, 
Pavel Novgorodtsev, and Bogdan Kistiakovskii played a key role in the develop‑
ment of the constitutional movement seeking to advance legal protection of civil 
rights. They worked in legal societies,67 gave lectures on comparative state law, and 
translated constitutional classics published in the West (for instance, Kistiakovskii 
translated G. Jellinek’s Constitutions, their changes and alterations and wrote an 
introduction to it68). 
The ideas of liberal transformation of political and legal life in Russia were 
suggested in the legal periodicals Pravo, Vestnik Prava, Iuridicheskii Vestnik 
and others, and collections of articles,69 to which Novgorodtsev, Kistiakovskii, 
Evgenii Trubetskoi, Vladimir Gessen, and other eminent Russian legal scholars 
contributed. Vladimir Gessen and Nikolai Lazarevskii were editors of the news‑
paper Pravo. The liberal jurists Iosif Gessen, Leon Petrażycki, Avgust Kaminka 
and Vladimir Nabokov took an active part in publishing this newspaper, which paid 
considerable attention to the issue of individual rights and their guarantees, and to 
the discussion of the bills of rights proposed by the Duma and the state. 
A democratic “revolution” took place in 1905 and 1906 in civil legal education 
and in legal consciousness on the whole. Michel Tissier has concluded that after 
1905, civil education was aimed at popularizing civil rights, while before 1905 only 
existing law was popularized. Tissier re‑examines early twentieth‑century debates 
about the Russians’ allegedly insufficient legal consciousness and argues that legal 
consciousness became understood in Russian intellectual thought in 1905 and 1906 
not in connection with law in the form of legislation, jurisprudence and customary 
law, but in relation to the idea of the existence of individual inalienable rights, 
their inclusion in the positive law of the Russian Empire and their unconditional 
application.70 William Pomeranz, a scholar of the legal culture of the Russian bar 
(advokatura), points to the formation of an advanced legal culture and professional 
ethos in the advokatura between 1864 and 1917, and to the appearance of many 
outstanding advocates of civil rights in the legal profession.71 The concept of the 
rule of law was accepted by educated society. 
67. See Michel Tissier, “Les sociétés juridiques dans l’Empire russe au tournant du xxe siècle: 
professionnalisation des juristes et culture juridique,” Cahiers du Monde russe, 51, 1 (2010): 
5‑34.
68. G.  Iellinek [G.  Jellinek], Konstitutsii, ikh izmeneniia i preobrazovaniia, perevod 
s nemetskogo pod redaktsiei i so vstupitel´noi stat´ei B.A.  Kistiakovskogo [Constitu‑
tions, their changes and alterations, translation from German, editing and introduction by 
B.A. Kistiakovskii] (SPb.: Izdanie Iuridicheskogo knizhnogo sklada “Pravo”, 1907).
69. Konstitutsionnoe Gosudarstvo: Sbornik statei Kistiakovskogo [Constitutional State: 
Selected papers by Kistiakovskii] (M.: Izdanie I.V.  Gessena, A.I.  Kaminka, 1905); Politi‑
cheskii Stroi Sovremennykh Gosudarstv Kistiakovskogo [The Political Systems of Contem‑
porary States by Kistiakovskii], vol. 1 (SPb: Izd‑vo P.D. Dolgorukogo i I.I. Petrunkevicha pri 
uchastii redaktsii gazety “Pravo,” 1905). 
70. Tissier, “Kakoe iuridicheskoe prosveshchenie nuzhno Rossii?” 60‑62.
71. William Pomeranz, “‘Profession or Estate’? The Case of the Russian Prerevolutionary 
‘Advokatura,’” The Slavonic and East European Review, 77, 2 (1999): 240‑268.
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Liberal theory gave an impulse to the formation in the twentieth  century 
of liberal parties, which included in their programs the ideas of human rights, 
civil equality and supremacy of law. As Novgorodtsev pointed out, the idea of 
natural law had found its place among the political ideas of Russian progres‑
sive parties, first of all the Kadet party, before contemporary jurists started 
speaking of it.72 Pavel Novgorodtsev, Vladimir Gessen, Bogdan Kistiakovskii, 
Evgenii  Trubetskoi and other representatives of “the revived natural law” 
school, alongside judicial positivist Gabriel´  Shershenevich and the leader of 
the sociological theory of law Nikolai Gredeskul, became Kadet theorists. They 
significantly contributed to the formation of the legal ideology of the liberal 
movement, which consolidated under the slogan of realizing individual rights 
and freedoms, and motivated the Russian government to guarantee subjective 
rights by law in 1905 and 1906. Their political ideal was the rule‑of‑law state, 
based on people’s representation in the state bodies, a government accountable 
to the Parliament and an independent court. 
The civil rights theory favored the formation and development of parliamen‑
tarianism in late imperial Russia. The State Duma became a social medium for 
discussing the content of civil rights and for developing appropriate bills, and also 
for organizing control over the enforcement of subjective rights by the execu‑
tive power. The Kadet faction introduced bills of personal immunity, freedom of 
conscience, assembly, unions, and press, and the fundamental provisions of civil 
equality laws to the First Duma. Their authors were Novgorodtsev, Kotliarevskii, 
Gessen and other jurists. They worked within the legislative committee of the Kadet 
party, which was divided after the First Duma into the Moscow and St. Petersburg 
departments. Novgorodtsev, Kotliarevskii, Shershenevich and others, who joined 
the Moscow department, focused on the projects on universal suffrage and civil 
equality, enriching them with statements about the abolition of estate, national and 
confessional differences. 
Elaborating on the content of legal reforms, supporters of the new natural law 
ideology proclaimed a new view of law. They interpreted it not as an order of state 
power, but as “an independent force directing and creating different forms of private 
and public life.”73 The theorists of the school believed that law was not established 
by the legislator, but was a manifestation of society’s legal consciousness. They 
made efforts not only to reveal this legal consciousness, but also to influence it. 
Jurists wrote about the critical state of legal consciousness during the revolutionary 
period, which manifested itself in a glaring discrepancy between positive law and 
the public ideal. Novgorodtsev saw the roots of the crisis in legal consciousness in 
the increasing gap between positive law and the moral foundations of public life. 
He understood the history of law as a history of constant changes in law. According 
to Novgorodtsev, law could only renew itself by rejecting its past; the scholar used 
72. Novgorodtsev, Nravstvennyi idealizm v filosofii prava, 595.
73. B.A. Kistiakovskii, “Nashi zadachi [Our objectives],” Iuridicheskii vestnik, no. 1 (1913): 
9, 15.
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the metaphor of “Saturn devouring his own children.” In the course of the emerging 
conflict, natural law was born as a demand for changes in the existing order and as 
an ideal plan for public reorganization. 
Analyzing the legislative activities of the First Duma, Novgorodtsev saw that his 
suppositions about the need for profound legal reforms were confirmed. He wrote:
When we set new principles stemming from the general demands for a 
rule‑of‑law state, we immediately discovered that these principles ran up against 
our old laws, built on absolutely different principles. We had to build on ground 
that was interwoven with old and widely spread roots. When attempting to 
abolish one set of laws, we immediately discovered that we had to think about 
abolishing or changing many other laws connected with it. And inspired by the 
idea which took us forward, we embarked on this difficult and enormous work 
whose completion meant changing the whole Russian legal system.74
Advocating wide‑scale legal reforms aimed at creating a rule‑of‑law state, scholars 
came to the conclusion that it was impossible in Russia at that time. They saw the 
main reason for this in the state of legal consciousness and power. Nikolai Laza‑
revskii wrote:
If the majority of the population does not know anything about its rights; if, 
accustomed to laws being broken, it looks upon this violation as something 
ordinary and inevitable; if for centuries the population has been used to 
being totally dependent upon the administration; […] if, on the other hand, 
administrative bodies haven’t yet realized that a common man may have rights, 
inviolable by an official […]; then in such a society the unconditional promotion 
of legality is practically impossible.75 
Jurists saw a way out of this situation in the collapse of the old regime and the 
establishment of a constitutional order. They suggested implementing their ideal 
with the help of a Constituent Assembly (Uchreditel´noe sobranie). Jurists ranked 
the vesting of rights and freedoms among the most important reforms which were 
to be carried out before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and elab‑
oration of the Constitution. This means that individual rights were supposed to 
become a leading force in changing the people’s legal consciousness in order to 
make them convinced of the supremacy of law and legality.
74. P.I. Novgorodtsev, “Zakonodatel´naia deiatel´nost Gosudarstvennoi Dumy [The legisla‑
tive activities of the State Duma],” in Pervaia Gosudarstvennaia Duma [The First State Duma] 
(SPb.: Izdanie M.V. Pirozhkova, 1907), Issue 2, 11. 
75. N.I. Lazarevskii, “Zakonnost´ i predely ee osushchestvleniia [Legality and the limits of its 
implementation],” Pravo, no. 2 (1905): 71.
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The positivists’ interpretation of civil rights 
While the complex theory of civil rights and freedoms was created around the turn 
of the twentieth century by Russian legal scholars belonging to the “revived natural 
law” school, the problem of civil rights attracted the attention of representatives of 
other trends of legal thought; namely, theorists of Judicial Positivism and Socio‑
logical Jurisprudence.
Positivist legal theory took shape as a consistent criticism of natural law theory 
and the dualism between positive and natural laws that characterizes it. One of 
its most prominent theorists was Gabriel´  Shershenevich, a professor of law at 
Moscow University and member of the Central Committee of the Kadet Party. 
Shershenevich argued that there is only one “true law” and that the notion of natural 
law should be discarded. He believed that the goal of the general theory of law was 
to define positive law.76
The doctrine of the main opponents of the natural law revivalists, which 
was developed by the Russian school of Judicial Positivism and represented by 
Gabriel´ Shershenevich, Veniamin Khvostov, Semen Pakhman, and others, did not 
attach crucial importance to civil rights. For them, civil rights were granted by the 
state and fixed by laws issued by the state. The doctrine of judicial positivism vested 
the state with the function of creator of civil rights: the state determined the content 
and scope of civil rights, enforced them, and, if necessary, took unpopular measures 
aimed at restricting the rights of its citizens. Positivists rejected the possibility of 
limiting the prerogatives of state power by means of civil rights, interpreting this as 
self‑restriction on the part of the state.77
Meanwhile, Shershenevich and other liberal positivist jurists thought that the 
task of the contemporary monarchical state was to encourage self‑action by Russian 
citizens by granting them civil and political freedoms and recognizing the principle 
of the equality of citizens before the law. Considering the state to be the source of 
law and subjective rights, they interpreted it in the spirit of the liberal legal tradition 
and saw its task as conferring individual rights and freedoms and protecting them in 
every possible way. They believed that a state capable of protecting the rights of its 
citizens was strong and efficient, while a state incapable of ensuring civil rights was 
doomed to weaken and make people doubt whether such a public‑law institution 
was necessary.78
The liberal positivists paid considerable attention to fundamental freedoms, in 
particular to freedoms of speech and press, which, in their view, were the basis for 
positive public opinion, the latter being the guarantor of the strength of the state 
76. G.F. Shershenevich, Obshchaia teoriia prava [General theory of law] (M.: Izd‑vo brat´ev 
Bashmakovykh, 1911), 273. 
77. V.D. Zor´kin, Pozitivistskaia teoriia prava v Rossii [The Positivist theory of law in Russia] 
(M.: Izd‑vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1978), 65; G.F. Shershenevich, Obshchaia teoriia prava 
[General theory of law], third edition (M.: Izd‑vo brat´ev Bashmakovykh, 1912), 609.
78. G.F. Shershenevich, Obshchaia teoriia prava (M., 1909‑1910), 368.
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and legal order. The freedom of meeting and assembly also ranked high, as it guar‑
anteed the right to the development of political and cultural life.79 The theorists of 
Judicial Positivism formulated legal guarantees for the observance of civil rights.80 
Thus, there is no denying the fact that the theory of civil rights was further devel‑
oped in this teaching. 
Unlike Judicial Positivism, which treated individual rights as conferred by the 
state, the theorists of Sociological Positivism considered individual rights to be a 
result of social development. The jurists of this school focused on the sociolog‑
ical approach to law, which presupposed defining legal issues in a wide social 
and historical context and in connection with the phenomena of public life. Thus, 
Sergei  Muromtsev identified the emergence of a need for political freedom in 
post‑reform Russian society. This need acquired the significance of a legal ideal 
and set the authorities the practical goal of procuring it:
The ideas of the inviolability of individual rights, freedom of thought and 
speech, and a state order that ensures these rights, have formed the basis for 
the ideal. […] Society’s endeavor to participate in the life of the state and its 
need for social activity have become facts that the government must take into 
account. […] If the governmental mechanism […] excludes […] society’s right 
to direct participation in state life […], this mechanism is subject to reformation. 
Muromtsev perceptively noted that the demand for civil rights is most acutely felt 
by educated society in the periods of radical social transformations.81 
Of particular interest is Muromtsev’s idea that the dichotomy between law and 
justice creates an impetus for legal reform. This idea is close to Novgorodtsev’s 
above‑cited statement about the opposition of positive and natural law. Muromtsev 
interpreted law as the actual state and justice as a desirable state embodying an 
aspiration to an ideal. According to him, as negative attitudes towards existing law 
in society increase, positive ideals of justice are established, and, in turn, become an 
impetus for legal reform.82 It was the formation of the positive ideal of justice that 
Muromtsev as chairman of the First Duma was dedicated to.
Nikolai Gredeskul, the representative of the sociological trend in law, wrote 
about the advantages of the sociological approach to law: 
Under the domination of the dogmatics of law, the ideal jurist […] is a 
“pushkinskii d´iak” (a clerk described by the Russian poet Pushkin) with a long 
79. V.M.  Khvostov, “Svoboda soiuzov i sobranii [Freedom of meeting and assembly],” 
Moskovskii ezhenedel´nik, no. 1 (1906): 9.
80. A. Rozhdestvenskii, Osnovy obshchei teorii prava [Fundamentals of the general theory of 
law] (M.: Izd‑vo V.S. Spiridonova, 1912), 144‑146.
81. S. Muromtsev, Statii i rechi (1878‑1910) [Articles and speeches (1878–1910)] (M.: Tipo‑
grafiia Obshchestva rasprostraneniia politicheskikh knig, 1910), 5, 21‑22.
82. S.A. Muromtsev, “Pravo i spravedlivost´ [Law and justice]” in Sbornik pravovedeniia i 
obshchestvennykh znanii (SPb., 1903, vol. 2), 10, 12.
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experience of office work, looking quietly at those who are right and those who 
are guilty […], who is always ready to solve the most complicated cases on the 
basis of current laws, while under sociological study, there appears an absolutely 
different ideal of the jurist […]. This jurist is an arbitrator in the struggle of 
social classes, a creator of law; this is a jurist who informs the community on 
what the law should be like, who carries out this duty as an impartial scholar, 
independent from above and below.83
The theorists of sociological jurisprudence Maksim  Kovalevskii and 
Nikolai Korkunov criticized the “revived natural law” theory for minimizing the 
role of the state and for its preferential attention to das Sollen and insufficient 
interest in das Sein. The supporters of the sociological approach to law pointed out 
the change of functions in the modern state in respect to the individual and indi‑
vidual rights as compared with the early modern state. They ascertained that the 
state which takes care of the protection of law (the rule‑of‑law state) is replaced by 
the state which cares for the common good (the social state). The latter infringes 
upon personal privacy and restricts individual freedom to secure freedoms 
for everyone84.
The basic postulates of Sociological Jurisprudence are as follows: civil rights 
appear as a result of the evolution of the state and society at a certain time and 
in certain conditions; the sphere of individual activity and the range of individual 
rights extend in accordance with the development of the state; certain stages in the 
development of society may be characterized by the constriction of the scope of 
individual rights and by strengthening control over them by the state. The institu‑
tions of the separation of powers, representation of people, local government, and 
the judicial protection of individual rights were recognized as guarantees for exer‑
cising civil rights. It was typical of the theorists of the sociological trend, as well 
as of the natural law revivalists, to recognize the priority of political rights in the 
system of human rights. They believed that political rights were first and foremost a 
condition for the legislative guarantee of rights and freedoms by the state and were 
in line with people’s duty to participate in government.85
Despite the positivists’ different interpretation of civil rights, they contributed 
to the creation of liberal legal doctrines which were aimed at the struggle for civil 
rights and freedoms, and for the consolidation of the rule‑of‑law state, whose 
83. N.A.  Gredeskul, Sovremennye voprosy prava [Contemporary legal issues] (Khar´kov: 
Izdanie knizhnogo magazina P.A. Breitigama, 1906), 14‑15.
84. M.M. Kovalevskii, Sotsiologiia [Sociology], vol. 1 (SPb.: Tipografiia M.M. Stasiulevicha, 
1910), 62; N.M.  Korkunov, “Gosudarstvo i svoboda [State and freedom],” Iuridicheskaia 
letopis´ [Juridical chronicle], vol. 1 (1892), 5.
85. M.M. Kovalevskii, Obshchee konstitutsionnoe pravo: Lektsii, chitannye v S.‑Peterburg‑
skom universitete i Politekhnikume [General constitutional law: Lectures given at St. Peters‑
burg University and Polytechnic school] (SPb.: Tipografiia “Sever,” 1907‑1908), 103‑106; 
M.M.  Kovalevskii, “Uchenie o lichnykh pravakh [The doctrine of individual rights],” 
Russkaia mysl´, Book IV (1905), 102‑103; Muromtsev, Stat´i i rechi, 1st ed., 64; 3rd ed., 54; 
N.M. Korkunov, Russkoe gosudarstvennoe pravo [Russian state law], vol. 1 (SPb.: Knizhnyi 
magazin A.F. Tsinzerliga, 1892), 363‑364.
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obligation was to grant freedoms and ensure their implementation. At the same 
time, it is obvious that the theorists of the “revived natural law” school had the most 
systematic approach to the institution of individual rights and freedoms. Kistiak‑
ovskii described the ideas of the supporters of the sociological theory and Jurid‑
ical Positivism as suffering from the same shortcoming: “They are so intertwined 
with society and the state that they absolutely ignore the importance of individual 
autonomy.”86
Conclusion
Russian liberal jurists of the early twentieth century made a significant contribution 
to the development of ideas about law and the state, in general, and about posi‑
tive and natural rights and the rule‑of‑law state in particular. A systematic theory 
of civil rights was formulated by the representatives of the “revived natural law” 
school. This theory became the basis for the doctrine of the rule‑of‑law state, which 
reconsidered ideas about the relationship between the individual and state authority 
in an authoritarian political regime. Russian jurists substantiated the claim that 
individual rights and freedoms were a significant institution in the rule‑of‑law state 
and that guaranteeing rights by law was a sign of and key element in building the 
rule‑of‑law state, with all its other features being subordinate.
The natural law revivalist theorists, relying on the key points of this scientific 
theory worked out by Russian and German legal philosophers, formulated the 
concept of subjective rights, which interpreted civil rights as natural and inalien‑
able, belonging to the individual by right of birth. Within the framework of this 
theory, they developed the idea that individuals were autonomous in their relation 
to the state and that the state was forbidden from interfering with their individual 
liberty outlined both by natural law and positive law. Taking into account the 
specific features of the Russian political system, the Russian legal philosophers 
determined a hierarchy of civil rights and freedoms (negative status rights, such as 
personal inviolability and the right to meeting and assembly, being at the top of this 
hierarchy), and developed the idea of individual rights guarantees, such as admin‑
istrative justice and the responsibility of ministers. The theory of subjective public 
rights laid the groundwork for the theory of citizenship, which was also actively 
developed by Russian legal scholars.
The key ideas created in Russian philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century 
(about inalienable civil rights and their protection from the state, the restriction of 
the state by law, the interdependence between law and the state of legal conscious‑
ness, about the inevitability of radical legal reforms, and about the separation of 
powers) had a truly revolutionary impact on the development of Russian legal 
thought. In the early twentieth century, legal theory developed on a wide ethical 
86. Kistiakovskii, Prava cheloveka i grazhdanina, 122‑123.
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and pluralistic basis. Due to this, Russian legal thought managed to overcome 
a simplistic interpretation of reality. 
Russian legal philosophers’ ideas had a solid reformatory potential and a great 
impact on the political situation in the country, too. They substantiated the need 
for liberal transformations in the political sphere and set the task of state judicial 
policy to be the establishment of the ideas of the rule‑of‑law state, the supremacy 
of law, and formal legal equality. The “revived natural law” theory contributed 
to the general direction in which Russian statehood developed in the early twen‑
tieth  century, its evolution from a state characterized by paternalistic attitudes 
towards the individual by public authority and its ambition for total regulation of 
the society’s life, to a rule‑of‑law state, which was based on the supremacy of law, 
formal equality, and the inherent worth of the individual, his or her freedom and 
dignity. The liberal theory of civil rights stimulated changes in the social system 
of imperial Russia. It became the platform for the progressive transformation of an 
estate‑based society into a civil society. 
The legal philosophy of modern Russia is characterized by a variety of concepts 
of civil rights formulated by liberal juridical, sociological, integrative, communica‑
tive, and other legal theories. This offers hope that within the framework of ideo‑
logical and legal variety, it will be possible to interpret the institution of individual 
rights and freedoms more broadly, and to comprehend conceptually the prospects 
for their development in the Russian Federation. The knowledge base accumu‑
lated by the Russian school of “revived natural law” is of great relevance in this 
respect. Its strongest point was that its representatives interpreted civil rights and 
the rule‑of‑law state on the basis of a thorough study of both the positive experi‑
ence of the political and legal development of European countries, and a profound 
knowledge of national Russian legal culture, history and modernity.
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